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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20020679-CA

vs.
LACY BISSEGGER,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for illegal possession or use of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), in the Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, the
Honorable James R. Taylor presiding.
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly determine that defendant, who was merely a
passenger, had no standing to contest the search of the vehicle or the opening of a
small jar left inside the passenger compartment?

1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant provision(s) are included in the Addendum:
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999); possession of unprescribed Lortab in a drug-free zone, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1999); and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l) (1999). R. 7.
Defendant was bound over on the methamphetamine and paraphernalia charges
following a preliminary hearing at which Provo Police Officer Brian Wolken
testified. R. 20, 113.
Defendant later filed a motion to suppress. R. 25-38. The State filed a
response, arguing that (a) defendant had no standing to challenge the search, and
(b) the search of the vehicle and its contents, including the Carmex jar, was valid
because the driver gave consent. R. 43-56. The trial court held a hearing on the
matter. R. 60-61. No transcript of the hearing is included in the record. The
minutes indicate that the prosecutor and defense counsel presented argument, but do
not indicate that any testimony was taken. Id.
The court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that defendant, as a
passenger, did not have standing to contest the legality of the search. R. 65-68.

The court further determined that when defendant exited the vehicle, leaving the
container behind, she abandoned the container, if it was hers, and consequently had
no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the container. R. 66.
Defendant entered a conditional plea, admitting to possession of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony. R. 85-91. She reserved the right to
contest the trial court's ruling denying her motion to suppress. R. 87.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On November 5, 2001, Provo Police Officer Brian Wolken stopped a car in
which defendant was a passenger because the vehicle had an expired registration.
R. 68. When the officer noted the smell of alcohol, he had the driver step out of

!

This statement of the facts is taken from the trial court's "Ruling on Motion to
Suppress." See R. 65-68. Defendant recites the facts according to the "Agreed Statement
of Facts re: Suppression Ruling" signed by both parties and allegedly the facts as found
by the trial court in rendering its ruling on the motion to suppress. See R. 105-107; Br.
Aplt., at *3 (Statement of Relevant Facts) (asterisks indicate page numbers the State has
used when referring to the unpaginated Brief of Appellant, beginning with " * 1 " for the
page that includes the "Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court"). The Agreed Statement,
however, was filed several months after the court's ruling. The trial court did not rely on
the Agreed Statement. Rather, the record suggests that the trial court rejected the Agreed
Statement's version of the facts. The Agreed Statement's version corresponds exactly to
the fact statement in defendant's proposed "Ruling on Motion to Suppress and Findings."
See R. 69-76. The trial court expressly declined to adopt that fact statement, stating that it
was "uncomfortable with the articulation of the findings and conclusions in [defendant's]
submitted 'Ruling.'" R. 68 (Ruling on Motion to Suppress).
Further, defendant has not challenged on appeal the trial court's findings nor its
rejection of her version of the facts. Moreover, nothing suggests that the trial court has
reviewed the Agreed Statement, let alone approved it as accurate, as required under rule
11(f) and (g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, prior to its inclusion in the record on
appeal.
3

the car for field sobriety tests. R. 67-68. The driver passed the tests, and the
officer concluded that the driver was not driving under the influence of alcohol. Id.
Because of the odor of alcohol, the officer wished to search the vehicle for open
containers and asked the driver for permission to conduct a search. R. 68.
Apparently believing that consent had been given,2 the officer asked defendant
to exit the vehicle to permit the search. Id. As defendant got out, the officer saw a
small, opaque lip balm ("Carmex") container on the dash. Id. He had not noticed
the container when looking into the car at an earlier point in the incident. Id.
During his search, the officer opened the Carmex container and discovered the
methamphetamine which was the basis for charging defendant with possession of a
controlled substance. Id. The officer found no open containers of alcohol in the
vehicle. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that Officer Wolken violated her Fourth Amendment rights
when he opened the Carmex container on the dashboard without probable cause and
without her consent. Br. Aplt., at *6 (Argument).3 The State concedes that Officer
2

Having concluded that defendant had no standing to contest the search of the
vehicle or jar, the court declined to determine whether consent was given. R. 67.
Further, the court did not address the scope of consent, if any.
3

In the first statement of her Argument, defendant claims that Officer Wolken's
search violated rights granted her by the United States Constitution and the Utah State
Constitution. Defendant, however, has suggested no reason for this Court to expand the
scope of her relevant rights under the Utah Constitution beyond the scope of those rights
(continued...)
4

Wolken did not have probable cause to search the vehicle or its contents.
Defendant's argument nevertheless fails because she has demonstrated no
expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the Carmex jar left in the vehicle.4

3

(...continued)
under the United States Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that Utah
courts should construe article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in a manner similar to
its federal counterpart unless compelling circumstances justify other treatment. State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1996). The Court has also given notice that
appellate courts will not engage in a separate state constitutional analysis unless an
argument for different state and federal constitutional analyses is briefed. State v.
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1988). Defendant has not presented a separate state
constitutional analysis of the issue here, and the State therefore does not address one.
4

Defendant also asserts in passing that she was illegally detained. Br. Aplt, at *6
(Argument). Defendant has not adequately briefed this issue, and this Court need not
address it. State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah App. 1998) ("[Defendant's brief
contains no legal analysis or authority to support [her] argument. . . . It is well
established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately
briefed."). Defendant has not provided any authority suggesting that an officer who is
conducting a search and who, to facilitate that search, asks a passenger to exit a vehicle,
thereby unreasonably detains the passenger. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415
(1997) (police officer may, as a matter of course, order passenger of lawfully stopped
vehicle to exit vehicle); State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (assuming
passenger was seized where officers were justified in stopping car to investigate
complaint against driver, seizure was reasonable). More importantly, the officer's
discovery of the methamphetamine in the Carmex jar was the result of his search of the
vehicle and jar, not the result of any detention of defendant. Thus, evidence found by
opening the methamphetamine jar was not "fruit" resulting from defendant's detention.
Cf Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (setting forth "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine).
5

ARGUMENT
BECAUSE DEFENDANT PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE THAT
SHE HAD AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE VEHICLE
OR CARMEX JAR, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
CONCLUDED THAT SHE HAD NO STANDING TO CONTEST
THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE OR OPENING OF THE JAR
Warrantless searches are presumed unreasonable unless the State can justify
the search under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Bisner,
2001 UT 99, U 43, 37 P.3d 1073. Fourth Amendment rights, however, are personal
in nature and may not be vicariously asserted. State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913,
915 (Utah App. 1992).
In other words, "the proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of
establishing that [her] own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
challenged search or seizure." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 n.l (1978). A
defendant may not invoke the exclusionary rule, even where an unreasonable search
has occurred, unless the defendant has a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place." Id. at 143. "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and
seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of
a third person's premises or property has not had any of [her] Fourth Amendment
rights infringed." Id. at 134.
"Furthermore, '[o]nce the defendant has been put on notice that the state
claims the warrantless search was constitutional because [the defendant] has no
expectation of privacy in the area searched, then the defendant must factually
6

demonstrate" that she does, in fact, have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 915 (quoting State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah
App. 1990)) (alterations in original). This expectation of privacy is sometimes
called "standing."5
A defendant claiming a legitimate expectation of privacy in an area (or
standing to suppress evidence from an unreasonable search of that area) must meet
a two-part test. State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah App. 1993). "First the
defendant must prove that [she] had a subjective expectation of privacy in the
searched area. Second, the defendant must prove that the expectation of privacy
was reasonable in the view of society as a whole." Id. A defendant who asserts no
property or possessory interest in an automobile or in property seized from the
automobile cannot prove a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the
property.6 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 129, 130 n.l, 148.
In its response to defendant's motion to suppress, the State argued that
defendant lacked standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim. R. 54. The State
thereby gave defendant notice that she had been put to her proof to show that she
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle and/or the Carmex jar.
5

For a discussion of the theoretical interplay between traditional principles of
standing and substantive Fourth Amendment rights, see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 428-29.
^'Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143
n.12.
7

Defendant, however, called no witnesses and presented no evidence that she
had a property or possessory interest in either the vehicle or the Carmex jar. She
attached no affidavits to her motion to suppress and apparently presented no
evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress. R. 25-38, 60-61. See also Br.
Aplt., at *2-3 (Statement of Relevant Facts) (conceding that "[n]o evidence was
taken by the Court nor offered by the parties at the motion hearing").
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Having received no evidence on
the matter, the trial court made no finding that defendant had a possessory or
property interest. Rather, the court found that defendant "did not have standing to
assert any objections the driver may have had to the fact or scope of the search of
his automobile" and that "she abandoned the container, if it was hers, by leaving it
behind." R. 66 (emphasis added).
Defendant suggests that the trial court "relied on the 'Stipulation of Facts'
signed by the parties and the transcript of the preliminary hearing." Br. Aplt., at *3
(Statement of Relevant Facts). The trial court, however, rejected the "Agreed
Statement of Facts re: Suppression Ruling." See footnote 1, supra. Further, the
record does not indicate that the trial court relied on the transcript of the
preliminary hearing.
In any case, even if the trial court did rely on the transcript of the preliminary
hearing, the only evidence from that hearing suggesting the possibility that
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Carmex jar is the
8

testimony of Officer Wolken. R. 113. Officer Wolken, the only witness, testified
that he thought the jar belonged to defendant because he did not notice the jar on
the dash until after he had asked defendant to step out. R. 113:13-14. This
testimony, had it been offered at the hearing on the motion to suppress, would not
have established defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the jar.7 This
court has already held that "an officer's belief is irrelevant to the question of a
defendant's expectation of privacy." State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 197 (Utah App.
1987).8 Further, defendant cannot rely on the State's burden to prove possession as
an element of the offense to satisfy her burden to prove a privacy interest in the
object of the search.9
7

Defendant apparently did not even assert at the time of the search that the car or
the Carmex jar washers. SeeR. 113:13-14.
8

In DeAlo, the defendant was stopped for speeding while driving a car that
belonged to the passenger's brother. 748 P.2d at 195. During the stop, the defendant
consented to a search of the vehicle for controlled substances. Id. The investigating
officer discovered cocaine in a secret compartment behind the back seat. Id. The
defendant filed a motion to suppress and, at the hearing, relied solely on testimony by the
officer that he understood that defendant was using the car with the owner's permission.
Id. at 196. This Court held that the defendant had not met his burden to prove a
legitimate expectation of privacy, observing that a "defendant's standing to object should
not depend on the state of the officer's belief as to the defendant's possessory interest in
the vehicle to be searched." Id. at 197 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
9

See State v. Kolster, 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah App. 1994) (rejecting automatic
standing rule that would grant standing to any defendant charged with possession of the
seized evidence at the time of the search); State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah App.
1993) ("Defendant's only real argument is that if the State claims, in order to prove he
committed a theft, that the money was in defendant's possession, then defendant must
necessarily have a privacy interest sufficient to establish standing—or at least the State
(continued...)
9

Defendant did not meet her burden to prove a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle or the jar. She did not establish that her own Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the search of the vehicle or the Carmex jar.
Even assuming an unreasonable search had occurred, she was not entitled to invoke
the exclusionary rule. The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.10
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. Alternatively, if this Court
concludes that defendant met her burden to prove that she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the vehicle and Carmex jar, this Court should remand to
the trial court for a determination of whether Officer Wolken had consent to search

9

(...continued)
should not be heard to argue otherwise. We disagree with defendant's assertion. Such an
argument is not sufficient to meet defendant's burden; defendant bears the burden of
proving his standing. Such proof is not made by pointing to an allegation made by the
State . . . .").
10

Defendant is not entitled to a remand for further proceedings on whether she had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the Carmex jar. The "proponent of a
motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that [her] own Fourth Amendment
rights were violated." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 424 n.l. Where a prosecutor argues that the
proponent "lacks standing to challenge [a] search," the proponent is "put to [her] proof on
any issue as to which [she] has the burden," including a demonstration of her property or
possessory interest in the place or item searched. Id. at 424 n.l & 430 n.12. If the
proponent fails to meet her burden, a reviewing court must assume that she had no
property or possessory interest. Id. at 424 n.l. Remand is not appropriate. Id.

10

the vehicle, whether the Carmex jar was within the scope of the consent, and
whether the driver's consent should be effective against the defendant.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on
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Addendum

58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense,
a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute
a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37,
37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons
with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of
management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and
upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a
firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not
to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which may be
for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle,
boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged
prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but
less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of

property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other
place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)
(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person,
that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not
included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license number
which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler,
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to
obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or
obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation
or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud,
forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or
the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to utter the
same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print,
imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who
commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug
Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon
conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of
those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking
lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;

(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through
(viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act
occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been
established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a first
degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true
age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described
in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described in
Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil
or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction or
acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this
state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or
persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or
substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge
of the character of the substance or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his professional
practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances
or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid
provision or application.
Amended by Chapter 12, 1999 General Session
Amended by Chapter 303, 1999 General Session
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